University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE) https://hdl.handle.net/10419/156095 2026-10-17T00:37:00Z 2026-10-17T00:37:00Z Gutmann, Jerg Langer, Pascal Neuenkirch, Matthias https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340063 2026-04-25T07:03:39Z 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: International Sanctions and Corruption Authors: Gutmann, Jerg; Langer, Pascal; Neuenkirch, Matthias Abstract: A major concern about the imposition of international sanctions is that they may permanently deteriorate the quality of institutions in target countries, potentially causing an increase in corruption. While case studies suggest that this is frequently the case, systematic evidence is so far missing. We provide the first cross-country statistical analysis of the impact of sanctions on public-sector corruption. Using a panel difference-in-differences model and an event study approach, we analyze sanctions against 125 countries from 1971 to 2019. Our results show that Western (and UN) sanctions cause a significant decline of corruption in democracies, while non-Western sanctions and those targeting autocracies have no systematic impact. Event study estimates time the reductions in corruption at about three to four years into the sanctions episode. They persist throughout the sanctions period, but once sanctions are lifted, corruption levels revert to their pre-treatment baseline, indicating that the corruption-reducing effect is limited to the duration of the sanctions episode. Further analysis reveals that the effect is stronger when sanctions explicitly target democratization or human rights improvements.

2026-01-01T00:00:00Z Gutmann, Jerg Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340821 2026-05-11T07:56:39Z 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Populism and constitutionalism Authors: Gutmann, Jerg; Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna Abstract: Populism is frequently described as a threat to constitutionalism, although some researchers emphasize that populists, too, draft, enforce, and derive legitimacy from constitutions. This chapter explains the theoretical foundations of these concerns and provides an overview of empirical evidence regarding the relationship between populism and constitutionalism.

2026-01-01T00:00:00Z Gutmann, Jerg Langer, Pascal Neuenkirch, Matthias https://hdl.handle.net/10419/342256 2026-07-20T13:12:13Z 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: International Sanctions and Constitutional Compliance Authors: Gutmann, Jerg; Langer, Pascal; Neuenkirch, Matthias Abstract: Many studies have evaluated whether sanctions improve or harm the living conditions of target populations, for example in terms of the protection of human rights. However, judging governments' responses to international sanctions based on their compliance with a universal human rights standard has been criticized as an imposition of Western values. We propose an alternative benchmark for government action that is not subject to the same criticism: whether governments comply with their own national constitutions as codified forms of the national social contract. Our analysis of 182 countries over the period 1962 to 2022 using panel DiD and event study estimators corroborates our theoretical expectation that government responses depend on the target's regime type. Whereas democracies improve their constitutional compliance under sanction pressure, autocracies start complying even less. These results suggest that sanctions can only make governments comply with their legal commitments if those governments face binding reelection constraints.

2026-01-01T00:00:00Z Gutmann, Jerg Langer, Pascal Neuenkirch, Matthias https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319718 2025-06-25T08:58:03Z 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Leader similarity and international sanctions Authors: Gutmann, Jerg; Langer, Pascal; Neuenkirch, Matthias Abstract: It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. Here, we ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data for the period 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Our results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanction imposition ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity in the sample to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity seems to matter especially for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights improvements, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.

2025-01-01T00:00:00Z