https://hdl.handle.net/10419/128 2026-09-23T00:56:43Z 2026-09-23T00:56:43Z Dittmann, Ingolf https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22187 2023-11-10T02:31:32Z 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Block Trading, Ownership Structure, and the Value of Corporate Votes Authors: Dittmann, Ingolf Abstract: This paper shows that open market block trading can provide a link between private benefits of control enjoyed by large shareholders and the ?voting premium?, i.e. the price difference between voting and non-voting shares. We first demonstrate in a microstructure model with informed traders and short-selling constraint that the trading activity of blockholders translates into a spread between the prices of voting and non-voting shares. In contrast to the extant theory, this model can explain the voting premium in the absence of corporate takeovers. In the empirical part of the paper, we show for a comprehensive sample of German dual-class companies that large trades occur more often in voting shares than in non-voting shares, and that the block trading activity in voting shares is strongly correlated with the voting premium. Moreover, the effect of the ownership structure on the voting premium becomes insignificant once we control for the block trading activity in voting shares.

2004-01-01T00:00:00Z Bethmann, Dirk https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22215 2023-11-12T02:38:07Z 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: The open-loop solution of the Uzawa-Lucas Model of Endogenous Growth with N agents Authors: Bethmann, Dirk Abstract: We solve an N 2 N player general-sum differential game. The optimization problem considered here is based on the Uzawa Lucas model of endogenous growth. Agents have logarithmic preferences and own two capital stocks. Since the number of players is an arbitrary fixed number N 2 N, the model?s solution is more general than the idealized concepts of the social planer?s solution with one player or the competitive equilibrium with infinitely many players. We show that the symmetric Nash equilibrium is completely described by the solution to a single ordinary differential equation. The numerical results imply that the influence of the externality along the balanced growth path decreases rapidly as the number of players increases. Off the steady state, the externality is of great importance, even for a large number of players.

2004-01-01T00:00:00Z Čížek, Pavel https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22185 2023-11-12T02:36:12Z 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: (Non) Linear Regression Modeling Authors: Čížek, Pavel Abstract: We will study causal relationships of a known form between random variables. Given a model, we distinguish one or more dependent (endogenous) variables Y = (Y1, . . . , Yl), l ∈ N, which are explained by a model, and independent (exogenous, explanatory) variables X = (X1, . . . ,Xp), p ∈ N, which explain or predict the dependent variables by means of the model. Such relationships and models are commonly referred to as regression models.

2004-01-01T00:00:00Z Demougin, Dominique M. Bental, Benjamin https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22214 2023-11-12T02:39:24Z 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity Authors: Demougin, Dominique M.; Bental, Benjamin Abstract: This paper proposes a transactions cost theory of total factor productivity. In a world with asymmetric information and transactions costs, effort, and thus productivity, must be induced by incentive schemes. Labor contracts trade off the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of effort. The latter include, in addition to the workers? marginal disutility of effort, also organizational costs and rents. As the economy grows, the optimal contracts change endogenously, inducing higher effort and measured productivity. Transactions costs are also affected by societal characteristics that determine the power of incentive contracts. Therefore, differences in these characteristics may explain cross-economy productivity differences. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the model is consistent both with time series and cross-country observations.

2004-01-01T00:00:00Z