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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110</id>
  <updated>2026-04-30T02:42:11Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-30T02:42:11Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Preference-driven contract design: How education alters risk, patience, and effort in incentive schemes</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336772" />
    <author>
      <name>Weikl, Jan</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336772</id>
    <updated>2026-02-19T02:56:21Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Preference-driven contract design: How education alters risk, patience, and effort in incentive schemes
Authors: Weikl, Jan
Abstract: Performance-contingent pay raises productivity, yet in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) only about 16% of workers report receiving performance pay, with the incidence being roughly seven percentage points higher among university graduates than among non-graduates. This coexistence of low aggregate take-up and a strong skill gradient is puzzling. This paper accounts for these twin facts with a principal-agent model in which the entire preference vector-risk aversion, probability weighting, time discounting, and effort cost-varies systematically with schooling. Endogenizing preferences yields two predictions: (i) optimal incentive slopes and induced effort increase with education-linked preferences; (ii) the productivity threshold for accepting performance pay falls with schooling, while heterogeneity in tastes keeps worker participation incomplete. A light calibration guided by documented schooling gradients reproduces modest overall incidence alongside a pronounced skill gradient. The key novelty is to treat the preference vector as an endogenous state variable that enters both sides of the principal-agent problem, shaping the optimisation problems of both the firm and the worker rather than being taken as a fixed primitive.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Unions and employers' associations in Germany: A survey of their membership, density and bargaining coverage</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311831" />
    <author>
      <name>Schnabel, Claus</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311831</id>
    <updated>2025-02-22T02:59:36Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Unions and employers' associations in Germany: A survey of their membership, density and bargaining coverage
Authors: Schnabel, Claus
Abstract: Trade unions and employers' associations play an important role in Germany not only in wage setting, but also in social policy and labour market regulation. While the majority of companies are organised in employers' associations, less than one fifth of employees are still members of a trade union. Union density has declined substantially over the last decades whereas on the employers' side density has fallen to a lesser extent as most employers' associations have introduced the option of bargaining-free membership. At the same time, the collective bargaining coverage of companies and employees has been reduced drastically. Nowadays, less than half of employees in Germany are formally covered by collective agreements. Nevertheless, collective agreements are still directly or indirectly relevant for three out of four employees, and they are an important anchor for wage setting in the entire economy. The erosion of (multiemployer) bargaining coverage has manifold reasons and has been associated with an increased heterogeneity in wage setting over the last decades. The ongoing falls in both bargaining coverage and union density have prompted a controversial discussion of how to stabilise the German system of industrial relations.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Pay clauses in public procurement: The wage impact of collective bargaining compliance laws in Germany</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/321882" />
    <author>
      <name>Pyka, Vinzenz</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/321882</id>
    <updated>2025-07-23T01:54:25Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Pay clauses in public procurement: The wage impact of collective bargaining compliance laws in Germany
Authors: Pyka, Vinzenz
Abstract: Using administrative data from Germany, this study provides first evidence on the wage effects of collective bargaining compliance laws. These laws require establishments receiving public contracts to pay wages set by a representative collective agreement, even if they are not formally bound by one. Leveraging variation in the timing of law implementation across federal states, and focusing on the public transport sector - where regulation is uniform and demand is driven solely by state-level needs - I estimate dynamic treatment effects using event-study designs. The results indicate that within five years of the law's implementation, wage increases were on average 2.9 to 4.6 per cent higher in federal states with such a law compared to those without one - but only in East Germany. These findings highlight the potential for securing collectively agreed wages in times of declining collective bargaining coverage.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Beyond collective agreements: The rise of the wage cushion in Germany</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330331" />
    <author>
      <name>Rieder, André</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Schnabel, Claus</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330331</id>
    <updated>2025-10-31T02:48:12Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Beyond collective agreements: The rise of the wage cushion in Germany
Authors: Rieder, André; Schnabel, Claus
Abstract: Representative establishment data reveal that over 60% of German plants covered by collective agreements pay wages above the level stipulated in the agree- ments, creating a wage cushion between actual and contractual wages. While collective bargaining coverage has fallen over time, the prevalence of wage cushions has increased, particularly in eastern Germany. Cross-sectional and fixed-effects analyses for 2008-2023 indicate that in western Germany the presence of a wage cushion is mainly related to plant profitability, unemployment, vacancies, and the business cycle. Plants which apply collective agreements at the firm rather than the sectoral level are less likely to have wage cushions since firm-level agreements make it easier to explicitly take firm-specific conditions into account. In eastern Germany, however, the explanatory power of these variables is much lower. Against the backdrop of falling bargaining coverage, the increasing prevalence of wage cushions suggests that the traditionally rigid German system of wage determination has become more flexible and differentiated.</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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