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  <title>EconStor Community:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108</id>
  <updated>2026-11-21T03:23:06Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-11-21T03:23:06Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Preference-driven contract design: How education alters risk, patience, and effort in incentive schemes</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336772" />
    <author>
      <name>Weikl, Jan</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336772</id>
    <updated>2026-02-19T02:56:21Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Preference-driven contract design: How education alters risk, patience, and effort in incentive schemes
Authors: Weikl, Jan
Abstract: Performance-contingent pay raises productivity, yet in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) only about 16% of workers report receiving performance pay, with the incidence being roughly seven percentage points higher among university graduates than among non-graduates. This coexistence of low aggregate take-up and a strong skill gradient is puzzling. This paper accounts for these twin facts with a principal-agent model in which the entire preference vector-risk aversion, probability weighting, time discounting, and effort cost-varies systematically with schooling. Endogenizing preferences yields two predictions: (i) optimal incentive slopes and induced effort increase with education-linked preferences; (ii) the productivity threshold for accepting performance pay falls with schooling, while heterogeneity in tastes keeps worker participation incomplete. A light calibration guided by documented schooling gradients reproduces modest overall incidence alongside a pronounced skill gradient. The key novelty is to treat the preference vector as an endogenous state variable that enters both sides of the principal-agent problem, shaping the optimisation problems of both the firm and the worker rather than being taken as a fixed primitive.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Unconditional cash transfers and maternal labor supply: Evidence from Bavaria's family allowance</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/341986" />
    <author>
      <name>Böhme, Fabian</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/341986</id>
    <updated>2026-11-14T02:50:57Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Unconditional cash transfers and maternal labor supply: Evidence from Bavaria's family allowance
Authors: Böhme, Fabian
Abstract: This paper investigates the labor supply effects of unconditional cash transfers aimed at young families, using the Bavarian Family Allowance (Familiengeld ), introduced in 2018. The policy provides € 250-300 monthly to families with children aged 13-36 months regardless of employment status or childcare use. Combining difference-in-differences estimates from two complementary panel datasets, I find no statistically significant effect on maternal employment: the pooled estimate is a small and imprecise +4.2 percentage points (95% CI [-1.8, +10.2]). Because Bavaria is the only treated state, I complement the difference-in-differences with randomization inference over placebo states and a synthetic difference-in-differences design that matches Bavaria's pre-policy trajectory; both confirm that Bavaria's estimate falls within the normal range of untreated states, and the specifications that most directly address an imperfect pre-trend-individual fixed effects and the synthetic estimator-center on zero. A triple-difference specification points to a larger positive response among single and low-income mothers, but this pattern does not survive randomization inference and is best read as suggestive. Given that the unconditional design generates only a modest income effect without altering the relative price of employment, the evidence does not support concerns that transfers of this size meaningfully reduce maternal labor supply, nor does it establish a positive activation effect.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Incomplete insurance and open-economy spillovers of labor market reforms</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/298854.2" />
    <author>
      <name>Hochmuth, Brigitte</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Merkl, Christian</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Stüber, Heiko</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/298854.2</id>
    <updated>2026-11-14T02:50:52Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Incomplete insurance and open-economy spillovers of labor market reforms
Authors: Hochmuth, Brigitte; Merkl, Christian; Stüber, Heiko
Abstract: This paper studies how an unemployment-benefit reform in one member state of a mon- etary union affects savings, net foreign asset positions, and fiscal space across member states when households face incomplete insurance. Lower benefits reduce unemploy- ment and increase fiscal space in the reforming country. Employed workers increase their precautionary savings to compensate for reduced public insurance. A portion of these savings is invested abroad, pushing the non-reforming country into a negative net foreign asset position and lowering its long-run consumption. Despite raising fis- cal space and long-run average consumption in the reforming country, the reform may decrease ex-ante welfare because it reduces insurance and depresses consumption during the transition as households self-insure through higher savings. We discipline our pro- posed model with firm-level evidence on Germany's post-reform tradable-sector expansion following the Hartz IV reform of unemployment benefits. In our simulation, this reform accounts for a substantial share of the observed post-reform open-economy adjustment, whereas the earlier wage moderation cannot explain most of the observed patterns.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The myth of restrictive working-time agreements: Firms' working-time adjustment after exit from collective bargaining</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/344102" />
    <author>
      <name>Pyka, Vinzenz</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Rieder, André</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/344102</id>
    <updated>2026-11-14T02:51:01Z</updated>
    <published>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The myth of restrictive working-time agreements: Firms' working-time adjustment after exit from collective bargaining
Authors: Pyka, Vinzenz; Rieder, André
Abstract: Employers in Germany argue that collective agreements restrict their flexibility concerning working hours. Using data from the IAB Establishment Panel for the years 2008 to 2024, we investigate working-time adjustments after exit from collective bargaining. We find that exit is associated with only a modest increase in weekly working hours of around 0.3 to 0.6 per cent using fixed-effects and event-study models, corresponding to eight to thirteen additional minutes per week. This adjustment occurs shortly after leaving collective bargaining coverage. We further find no evidence that other margins of working-time adjustment, such as Saturday or Sunday work, are used more extensively after exit. In contrast to previous survey evidence, our findings call into question that working-hours constraints are one of the main drivers of exit from collective bargaining coverage.</summary>
    <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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