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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107441" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107441</id>
  <updated>2026-05-02T17:39:53Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-05-02T17:39:53Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Pricing in asymmetric two-sided markets: A laboratory experiment</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201664" />
    <author>
      <name>Weghake, Jens</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Erlei, Mathias</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Keser, Claudia</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Schmidt, Martin</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201664</id>
    <updated>2023-11-19T02:12:14Z</updated>
    <published>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Pricing in asymmetric two-sided markets: A laboratory experiment
Authors: Weghake, Jens; Erlei, Mathias; Keser, Claudia; Schmidt, Martin
Abstract: We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the price setting behavior in two-sided markets. We seek to answer two specific research questions: Do participants charge the equilibrium prices that can be derived from a theoretical model? How is the price setting affected by the characteristics of the Nash equilibrium? Our study shows that there are hardly any realizations of the Nash equilibrium. Participants seem to use simple heuristics. The increase in complexity caused by asymmetry has two effects: On the one hand, it makes finding the optimal pricing more difficult so that, on average, we find prices that are further away from optimal prices. On the other hand, higher complexity goes along with stronger signals against non-expedient heuristics so that, on an individual level, the equilibrium is reached in more markets.</summary>
    <dc:date>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Wa(h)re Liebe: Was Online-Dating-Plattformen über zweiseitige Märkte lehren</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201663" />
    <author>
      <name>Weghake, Jens</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Roß, Wiebke</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201663</id>
    <updated>2023-11-28T09:35:49Z</updated>
    <published>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Wa(h)re Liebe: Was Online-Dating-Plattformen über zweiseitige Märkte lehren
Authors: Weghake, Jens; Roß, Wiebke
Abstract: Dating-Plattformen werden aufgrund des vergleichsweise einfachen Geschäftsmodells und der klaren Unterscheidung der Marktseiten anhand des Geschlechts regelmäßig als Beispiel für zweiseitige Märkte genannt. Hinsichtlich der Preissetzung entspricht der Markt jedoch nicht den Implikationen der Theorie. Dies liegt nicht an regulatorischen Vorgaben, weil eine Preisdifferenzierung aktuell nicht im Widerspruch zum Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetz steht und damit erlaubt ist. Zum einen kann ein fehlendes Bewusstsein für die Besonderheit des Marktes ursächlich für eine fehlende Preisdifferenzierung sein. Dies hat eine geringe Effizienz aufgrund der nicht erfolgten Internalisierung der indirekten Netzwerkeffekte zur Folge. Zum anderen gibt es Indizien für Ungleichheitsaversion bei den Plattformnutzern. Diese wirken entgegen der indirekten Netzwerkeffekte, sodass gleiche Preise für die Marktseiten folgerichtig sein können. Damit wird ein Aspekt aufgezeigt, um den die Theorie zweiseitiger Märkte erweitert werden kann.</summary>
    <dc:date>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The enterprise is the actual place for the entrepreneurial function in economic theory</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/147496" />
    <author>
      <name>Braun, Eduard</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/147496</id>
    <updated>2023-11-22T02:36:35Z</updated>
    <published>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The enterprise is the actual place for the entrepreneurial function in economic theory
Authors: Braun, Eduard
Abstract: The enterprise is an historical phenomenon specific to capitalism. It is a fictional agent created by accounting and sanctioned by law. It is based on capital and its purpose is to yield monetary profit. Within the framework of the market economy, production is organized according to the decisions and actions of the aggregate of these artificially created agents. This paper demonstrates that the "entrepreneur" as used in economic theory is nothing but a personification of the enterprise. In the most renowned economic theories of entrepreneurship, the entrepreneurs are supposed to be in possession of the resources they employ. Yet the functions which these theories ascribe to the entrepreneurs implicitly presuppose that the latter not only possess resources, but that they actually own them. Without capital, which grants the power to obtain property rights in resources, entrepreneurs would not be able to bear the losses that come along with the entrepreneurial functions. The theories violate their own definitions by changing their object from a "pure" and property-less entrepreneur to a capital-owning agent. These theories can be reinterpreted, therefore, as applying not to the pure entrepreneur but to the capital-based enterprise. They then become theories of how and according to which principles enterprises organize the production process in capitalism. In contrast to the theoretical construct of the entrepreneur, enterprises are even present, though only implicitly, in neoclassical equilibrium analysis. They provide the setting of optimal decision making and therein constitute the tacit rationale of the notorious assumptions of complete foresight and perfect rationality.</summary>
    <dc:date>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Why the QWERTY-phenomenon is not just "in the minds of theorists" and why it could nonetheless be no problem in reality</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/147497" />
    <author>
      <name>Weghake, Jens</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Grabicki, Fabian</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/147497</id>
    <updated>2023-12-30T03:05:24Z</updated>
    <published>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Why the QWERTY-phenomenon is not just "in the minds of theorists" and why it could nonetheless be no problem in reality
Authors: Weghake, Jens; Grabicki, Fabian
Abstract: Researchers disagree about the relevance of the so called QWERTY-phenomenon which simply means to get stuck in a bad equilibrium. There exists two contrary parties. One side says that the major influence for market success comes from greater quality. In consequence an inferior market player should not persist and the possibility of the QWERTY-phenomenon is denied by this party. The opposite side emphasize the importance of network effects which can lead to lock-ins in inferior situations. This papers investigates this debate. We demonstrate that the missing consideration of the status quo bias in previous studies leads to a rejection of the QWERTY-phenomenon. We give several examples of different industries with inferior market share leaders. However, we suggest that this phenomenon is just a temporary harm and the lock-in could be overcome by a specific form of Schumpeterian creative destruction. Therefore we claim that even if lock-ins exist it is no problem as long as innovative market participants have the opportunity to develop and introduce new business models.</summary>
    <dc:date>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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