https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107392 2026-11-13T20:41:08Z 2026-11-13T20:41:08Z Polk, Andreas https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175190 2023-11-03T02:11:11Z 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Lobbyism in Germany: What do we know? Authors: Polk, Andreas Abstract: Based on the two main channels of influence seeking, contribution payments and informational lobbying, we survey empirical studies about lobbying in Germany and discusses the available data and research approaches. Based on two novel data sets, we provide first insights towards further steps of empirical lobbying research. Given the overall lack of available data on lobbying in Germany, we identify research gaps and discuss new methodological approaches which might lead to a better understanding of the lobbying process.

2017-01-01T00:00:00Z Fidrmuc, Jarko Lind, Ronja https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175189 2023-12-10T02:41:15Z 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis Authors: Fidrmuc, Jarko; Lind, Ronja Abstract: We present a meta-analysis of the impact of higher capital requirements imposed by regulatory reforms on the macroeconomic activity (Basel III). The empirical evidence derived from a unique dataset of 48 primary studies indicates that there is a negative, albeit moderate GDP level effect in response to a change in the capital ratio. Meta-regression results suggest that the estimates reported in the literature tend to be systematically influenced by a selected set of study characteristics, such as econometric specifications, the authors’ affiliations, and the underlying financial system. Finally, we document a significant positive publication bias.

2017-01-01T00:00:00Z Berlemann, Michael Christmann, Robin https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175188 2023-12-30T02:32:10Z 2016-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Determinants of In-Court Settlements: Empirical Evidence from a German Trial Court Authors: Berlemann, Michael; Christmann, Robin Abstract: Because verdicts are typically the more costly resolution of legal disputes, most governments are interested in high settlement rates. In this paper, we use a unique dataset of 860 case records from a German trial court to explore which factors have a significant impact on the decision to settle in civil law litigation. We find that case-specific factors, procedural aspects and individual characteristics of the involved judge have a significant impact on settlement probability. Interestingly, we find supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the gender of the involved judge has an impact on settlement probabilities in certain subfields of law. Based on our empirical results, we derive some conclusions for legal policies that aim at increasing settlement rates.

2016-01-01T00:00:00Z Ahrend, Rudiger Farchy, Emily Kaplanis, Ioannis Lembcke, Alexander C. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175187 2023-12-30T02:47:37Z 2016-01-01T00:00:00Z

Title: What Makes Cities More Productive? Evidence from 5 OECD Countries on the Role of Urban Governance Authors: Ahrend, Rudiger; Farchy, Emily; Kaplanis, Ioannis; Lembcke, Alexander C. Abstract: In estimating agglomeration benefits across five OECD countries, this paper represents the first empirical analysis that contrasts cross-country evidence on agglomeration benefits with the productivity impact of metropolitan governance structures, while taking into account the potential sorting of individuals across cities. The comparability of results in a multi-country setting is supported through the use of a new internationally-harmonised definition of cities based on economic linkages rather than administrative boundaries. The analysis finds that cities with fragmented governance structures tend to have lower levels of productivity. The estimated elasticity for an increase in the number of local jurisdiction is 0.06, which is halved by the existence of a metropolitan governance body. The effect is sizeable, as the analysis confirms the result in the literature that city productivity increases with city size with an elasticity in the range of 0.02 to 0.05.

2016-01-01T00:00:00Z