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  <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104612" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104612</id>
  <updated>2026-04-29T14:45:50Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-29T14:45:50Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>The political economy of law enforcement</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/229932" />
    <author>
      <name>Dewey, Matías</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Woll, Cornelia</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Ronconi, Lucas</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/229932</id>
    <updated>2023-11-19T02:31:09Z</updated>
    <published>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The political economy of law enforcement
Authors: Dewey, Matías; Woll, Cornelia; Ronconi, Lucas
Abstract: The legal order is the legitimate foundation of liberal democracy. Its incomplete enforcement of the law can therefore appear dysfunctional, reflecting weak institutions, state capture, and corrupt practices. This paper casts doubt on such categorical assessments by systematically examining the reasons for and intentions behind incomplete enforcement. It argues that law enforcement is part of the political process that is deeply affected by the constellation of actors concerned. Choices over law enforcement produce social order that is analytically distinct from the production of legal norms and their formal implementation. By analyzing different types of partial enforcement, its rationales, and intended effects, we propose an approach that studies law enforcement as an integral part of public policy analysis and of the study of socioeconomic orders.</summary>
    <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Ups and downs in finance, ups without downs in inequality</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/247780" />
    <author>
      <name>Godechot, Olivier</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Neumann, Nils</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Apascaritei, Paula</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Boza, István</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Hällsten, Martin</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Henriksen, Lasse Folke</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Hermansen, Are</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Hou, Feng</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Jung, Jiwook</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Kodama, Naomi</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Křížková, Alena</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lippényi, Zoltán</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Marta, Elvira</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Melzer, Silvia Maja</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Mun, Eunmi</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Sabanci, Halil</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Soener, Matthew</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Thaning, Max</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/247780</id>
    <updated>2023-11-24T10:00:47Z</updated>
    <published>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Ups and downs in finance, ups without downs in inequality
Authors: Godechot, Olivier; Neumann, Nils; Apascaritei, Paula; Boza, István; Hällsten, Martin; Henriksen, Lasse Folke; Hermansen, Are; Hou, Feng; Jung, Jiwook; Kodama, Naomi; Křížková, Alena; Lippényi, Zoltán; Marta, Elvira; Melzer, Silvia Maja; Mun, Eunmi; Sabanci, Halil; Soener, Matthew; Thaning, Max
Abstract: The upswing in finance over the past several decades has led to rising inequality, but do downswings in finance lead to a symmetric decline in inequality? In this paper, we analyze the asymmetry of the effect of ups and downs in financial markets, as well as the effect of increased capital requirements and the bonus cap on national earnings inequality. We use administrative employer-employee linked data on earnings from 1990 to 2017 for twelve countries. Additionally, we use data on earnings from bank reports, from 2009 to 2017 in thirteen European countries. We find a strong asymmetry in the effects of financial ups and downs on earnings inequality, a mitigating effect of rising capital requirements on the contribution of finance to inequality, and a restructuring effect of the bonus cap for the earnings of financiers, while neither policy affects absolute levels of earnings inequality.</summary>
    <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Gauging the gravity of the situation: The use and abuse of expertise in estimating the economic costs of Brexit</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249446" />
    <author>
      <name>Semken, Christoph</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Hay, Colin</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249446</id>
    <updated>2023-12-14T02:42:46Z</updated>
    <published>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Gauging the gravity of the situation: The use and abuse of expertise in estimating the economic costs of Brexit
Authors: Semken, Christoph; Hay, Colin
Abstract: HM Treasury's estimation of the economic consequences of Brexit - using standard macroeconomic models - during the EU referendum campaign represents a remarkable intervention in a highly politicized public debate. It raises a series of questions about the use of economic expertise. Through a detailed theoretical and empirical critique of the Treasury's methodology - and a reassessment of the likely effects of Brexit in light of this - we cast doubt on the utility of their approach, highlighting methodological issues, unrealistic assumptions, and misrepresentations of established facts. In the process we seek to identify some of the wider implications for the use and potential abuse of economic expertise in highly charged political contexts, such as the EU referendum debate.</summary>
    <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Primary dealer systems in the European Union</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10419/213854" />
    <author>
      <name>Preunkert, Jenny</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/213854</id>
    <updated>2023-11-10T02:18:11Z</updated>
    <published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Primary dealer systems in the European Union
Authors: Preunkert, Jenny
Abstract: States require money to function and therefore every government has to continuously raise new funds. On the financial markets, governments cannot be sure that auctions of their debt will be sufficiently attractive to financial investors, which is why governments usually enter into cooperative agreements with selected banks. The best known and most widespread form of cooperation is the primary dealer system. Primary dealers are banks that agree to participate regularly in government debt auctions and to act as formalized market makers on government debt markets. The article analyzes European primary dealer systems and asks why banks are willing to participate in these systems. I will show that both domestic and foreign banks use their status as primary dealers to build long-term relationships with one or more European governments and to gain an advantage on the global stage. In Bourdieu's terms, primary dealer banks use their financial capital to accumulate social and symbolic capital.</summary>
    <dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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