Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98441 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2013-052
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as unfolding in time, concessions can also be studied in normal form or by conditioning only on failure of earlier agreement attempts. We experimentally compare three protocols of concession bargaining, the normal form or static one, the one where concessions only condition on earlier failures and the truly dynamic one. In spite of their considerable differences in conditioning, the three protocols do not differ in agreement ratio, efficiency and inequality of agreements. There are, however, effects of the maximal number of trials to reach an agreement by concession making and of protocol on when to abstain from conceding.
Schlagwörter: 
concession bargaining
conflict
deadline
dynamic interaction
emotions
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
638.55 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.