Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/96071 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2008-01
Verlag: 
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics, Ramat-Gan
Zusammenfassung: 
Players in a congestion game may differ from one another in their intrinsic preferences (e.g., the benefit they get from using a specific resource), their contribution to congestion, or both. In many cases of interest, intrinsic preferences and the negative effect of congestion are (additively or multiplicatively) separable. This paper considers the implications of separability for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and the prospects of spontaneous convergence to equilibrium. It is shown that these properties may or may not be guaranteed, depending on the exact nature of player heterogeneity.
Schlagwörter: 
congestion games
separable preferences
pure equilibrium
finite improvement property
potential
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
727.39 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.