Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94610 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics No. 1999-21
Verlag: 
Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics, Claremont, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
In signaling environments ranging from consumption to education, high quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal or countersignal. High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignaling itself is a signal of confidence which separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.
Schlagwörter: 
signaling
countersignaling
understatement
JEL: 
C72
D82
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
342.9 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.