Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93829 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 268
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a theoretical model in which ?rms are either private or state-owned. When ?rms become insolvent, the government can intervene with general measures, like subsidies, or by nationalizing ?rms. The government only intervenes when the bankruptcy of a ?rm entails social costs. In a stylized model, we analyze how government interventions a?ect allocative and productive efficiency. Nationalization of private ?rms in case unpro?table investments were made, leads to increased allocative efficiency despite private ownership. The effort level chosen by the managers working for ?rms is also affected by government intervention with an impact on productive efficiency.
Schlagwörter: 
nationalization
efficiency
JEL: 
L33
P31
P51
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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