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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4492
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing, where private information affecting collective-value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions towards the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. We show that, unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbours; and that these incentives are stronger, and provision of the pure public good greater, the smaller are individuals' social neighbourhoods.
Schlagwörter: 
private provision of public goods
information transmission
social learning
JEL: 
H10
L30
D60
D70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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