Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/89175 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-159
Verlag: 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC
Zusammenfassung: 
The capacity to sustain policies over time and the capacity to adjust policies in the face of changing circumstances are two desirable properties of policymaking systems. The veto player approach has suggested that polities with more veto players will have the capacity to sustain policies at the expense of the ability to change policy when necessary. This paper disputes that assertion from an intertemporal perspective, drawing from transaction cost economics and repeated game theory and showing that some countries might have both more credibility and more adaptability than others. More generally, the paper argues that, when studying the effects of political institutions on policy outcomes, a perspective of intertemporal politics might lead to predictions different from those emanating from more a-temporal approaches.
Schlagwörter: 
Political institutions
Public policies
Veto players
Policy adaptability
Policy stability
Intertemporal
Credibility
Repeated games
JEL: 
D72
D78
H10
H50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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