Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88627 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 126
Publisher: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Abstract: 
This paper studies unshrouding decisions in a framework similar to Gabaix and Laibson (2006), but considers an alternative unshrouding mechanism where the impact of advertising add-on information depends on the number of unshrouding firms. We show that shrouding becomes less prevalent as the number of competing firms increases. With unshrouding costs a non-monotonic relationship between the number of firms and unshrouding may arise.
Subjects: 
Bounded rationality
Add-on pricing
Shrouding
JEL: 
D40
D80
L10
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-125-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.