Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/87752 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ETLA Discussion Papers No. 715
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the Stability and Growth Pact of EMU in a two-country model of monetary union with rational expectations and with spillovers of macroeconomic policies between the countries. The paper concentrates on tax policy, and shows that the results on optimal policy crucially depend on whether the demand channel of taxes through aggregate demand, or the supply channel, from taxes through wage formation, dominates in the determination of the rate of inflation and the international spollovers of policy. An optimal stability pact, which corrects the inefficiencies in policy making considered here, i.e., the lack of fiscal policy myopia, is derived. Finally, an evaluation of the deterrent power of the existing Stability Pact with respect to deficit spending is derived and found to be quite small in comparison to the short-run gains related to risking the sanctions of the Pact.
Schlagwörter: 
Monetary union
stability pact
fiscal policy
coordination
JEL: 
E00
E62
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.38 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.