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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 08-120/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program. Ex-ante leniency programs are effective if and only if these offer substantial rewards to the self-reporting firm. This is in contrast to currently employed programs that are therefore ineffective.
Schlagwörter: 
Cartel
Antitrust Policy
Antitrust Law
Antitrust regulation
Leniency program
Self-reporting
repeated game
JEL: 
L41
K21
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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