Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/86176 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 22
Publisher: 
University of Freiburg, Department of International Economic Policy (iep), Freiburg i. Br.
Abstract: 
Analyzing law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 Russian regions for the period 2004-2007, we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels: Corruption declines as relative salaries rise up to a turning point, beyond which corruption rises again. Other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement, available rents through government budgets and natural resources, education levels, unemployment rates, and income inequality.
Subjects: 
Corruption
Russia
bureaucracy
law enforcement
JEL: 
K42
H10
P26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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