Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/83667 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
RatSWD Working Paper No. 223
Publisher: 
Rat für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsdaten (RatSWD), Berlin
Abstract: 
We analyse optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two-sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the (non-linear) externalities between readers and authors in a journal. We show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of highquality journals. Besides, we find that the removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) will likely increase both readership and authorship, will decrease journal profits, and may increase social welfare.
Subjects: 
two-sided markets
academic journals
open access
removal of copyright
welfare effects
JEL: 
L11
L82
O34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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