Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/83497 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 110
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper explores the relationship between the intensity of competition in product markets and firms' incentives to lower their production costs by illegal means. Our framework combines a Salop circle with a crime model à la Becker, allowing us to differentiate between several measures for the intensity of competition. We establish that more firms in the industry (i.e., lower entry costs) reduce the crime rate. Furthermore, whether more intense competition due to the increased substitutability of products raises or lowers the prevalence of criminal behavior can be clearly linked to the impact of such behavior on firms' production costs. Finally, we find that stricter law enforcement may entice more firms to enter the market, despite the higher expected sanction in the event of wrongdoing.
Schlagwörter: 
product market competition
crime
deterrence
market entry
JEL: 
K14
K23
L13
ISBN: 
9783863041090
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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