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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2013:10
Verlag: 
Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy (IFAU), Uppsala
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the disability insurance program has been governed over time. We analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year, by using ex-post mortality. Applying the strategy to Sweden, we find large variation in the relative health of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries over time. Some of the fluctuations correspond well to formal changes to screening stringency. However, we also find large variation in health during periods when no changes to formal eligibility criteria have been pursued.
Schlagwörter: 
disability insurance
screening stringency
proportional hazard model
JEL: 
C41
I18
J14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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