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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 207
Verlag: 
Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
When a firm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small managerial bonus linked to firm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring shareholders. A negative relation between corporate bond yields and managerial bonuses can be predicted. Furthermore, the model shows how higher managerial pay-performance sensitivity goes hand in hand with greater company leverage and lower company diversification. These predictions find some support in the empirical literature.
Schlagwörter: 
Managerial Compensation
Financial Structure
Monitoring
Diversification
JEL: 
G32
M12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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