Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81512 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 890
Publisher: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Abstract: 
We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price discrimination but no exclusive contracts; and (iv) no regulation: the network operator can sell exclusive rights to content providers. We compare the equilibrium outcomes explicitly accounting for dynamic incentives to invest in improving the Quality of Service offered to each content provider. We provide a ranking Quality of Service and network operator profits across regimes.
Subjects: 
Network neutrality
Internet price discrimination
Exclusivity
Quality of Service
Network management
Congestion
AT&T
Verizon
Google
JEL: 
C63
D40
D42
D43
L10
L12
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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