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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7477
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information about norms of behavior. Compared to a setting with uninformed principals agents exert nearly 50% higher efforts under a fixed wage contract when an informed principal had chosen this contract. Apparently the informed principal's choice signals a norm not to exploit the trust which leads to more trustworthy behavior. This mechanism's robustness is explored in further experiments.
Schlagwörter: 
social norms
contracts
incentives
signaling
experiments
JEL: 
D03
C91
D86
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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