Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/80569 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7488
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study asset-tested unemployment insurance in an incomplete markets model with moral hazard during job search. Asset testing has two counteracting effects on welfare. On the one hand, it improves consumption insurance by introducing state contingent transfers to agents most in need. On the other hand, it worsens the moral hazard problem, since workers have a reduced incentive to save and fewer private resources are used for consumption smoothing during unemployment. Our results show that in a realistically calibrated model of the U.S. economy the two effects nearly offset each other - the optimal rate of asset-testing is approximately zero. This finding is robust to several alternative specifications of the model, including a case with heterogeneous time-discount factors. We conclude that the current U.S. unemployment insurance system is approximately optimal.
Schlagwörter: 
unemployment insurance
asset-testing
incomplete markets
consumption and saving
JEL: 
E21
E24
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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