Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/78424 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 6/2001
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate a team production problem where two parties sequentially invest to generate a joint surplus. In this framework, it is possible to implement the first best even if the investment return is highly uncertain. The optimal contract entails a basic dichotomy: it is a simple option contract if the investments of both parties are substitutive, and a linear incentive contract if they are complementary. These schemes can be interpreted in terms of asset ownership: for the case of substitutive investments, a conditional ownership structure is optimal while for complementary investments shared equity in combination with a bonus component renders efficiency feasible. In either case, the parties renegotiate the initial arrangement after the first party invested.
Schlagwörter: 
Team Production
Asset Ownership
Sequential Investments
JEL: 
D23
K12
L23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
368.57 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.