Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/78408 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 1/2002
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We report results of experiments designed to test the predictions of the best reply process. In a Cournot oligopoly with four firms, the best reply process should theoretically explode if demand and cost functions are linear. We find, however, no experimental evidence of such instability. Moreover, we find no differences between a market which theoretically should not converge to Nash equilibrium and one which should converge because of inertia. We investigate the power of several learning dynamics to explain this unpredicted stability.
Schlagwörter: 
best reply process
Cournot oligopoly
learning experiments
imitation
JEL: 
C72
C92
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
246.12 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.