Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76768 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 09-04
Verlag: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Zusammenfassung: 
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this party testifies. When the evidence is close to the prior mean, no party testifies. We compare this outcome under a purely adversarial procedure with the outcome under a purely inquisitorial procedure (Emons and Fluet 2009). We provide sufficient conditions on when one procedure is better than the other one.
Schlagwörter: 
evidence production
procedure
costly state falsification
adversarial
inquisitorial
JEL: 
D82
K41
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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