Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76245 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 0209
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate how various institutional settings affect a network provider's incentives to invest in infrastructure quality. Under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives turn out to be smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration, though we also provide counter-examples. The introduction of downstream competition for the market can sometimes improve incentives. With suitable non-linear access prices investment incentives under separation become identical to those under integration.
Schlagwörter: 
investment incentives
networks
quality
vertical externality
JEL: 
D42
L22
L43
L92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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