Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73757
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
ifo Working Paper No. 92
Publisher: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Abstract: 
Empirical literature has found evidence in favour of household bargaining models.In contrast to earlier tests that are limited to assignable private goods, we use childpreference data in order to extend the empirical evidence on household bargaining topublic household goods. In the empirical analysis, we exploit the different theoreticalpredictions for couples with heterogeneous and homogeneous preferences derivedfrom household models. Our results indicate that couples bargain over fertility.Furthermore, we find that the ability to commit to household resource allocationsdepends on the gender of the partner with higher preferences.
Subjects: 
Fertility
child preferences
intra-household allocation
bargaining
limited commitment
JEL: 
D01
D13
J13
J18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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