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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1221
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
We report on the nature of a utility optimizing transfer from one regional government to another when local public goods are present. Computer examples reveal that small differences in regional endowments result in large differences in equilibrium outcomes for two regions, under optimal transfers. The scale effect (lower tax charge per person for the same public good in more populous regions) leads to the small region generally providing transfers to the larger region.
Schlagwörter: 
intergovernmental transfers
local public goods
inter-regional resource allocation
JEL: 
H41
H77
R28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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