Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67105
Authors: 
Coenen, Michael
Jovanovic, Dragan
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 77
Abstract: 
We analyze a constrained dictator game in which the dictator splits a pie which will be subsequently created through simultaneous investments by herself and the recipient. We consider two treatments by varying the maximum attainable size of the pie leading to either high or low investment incentives. We find that constrained dictators and recipients invest less than a model with self-interested players would predict. While the splitting decisions of constrained dictators correspond to the theoretical predictions when investment incentives are high, they are more selfish when investment incentives are low. Overall, team productivity is negatively affected by lower investment incentives.
Subjects: 
Bargaining Game
Dictator Game
Investment Incentives
Team Production
JEL: 
C72
C91
D01
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-076-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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