EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66875
  
Title:What drives immigration amnesties? PDF Logo
Authors:Casarico, Alessandra
Facchini, Giovanni
Frattini, Tommaso
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 3981
Abstract:We develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model.
Subjects:illegal immigration
amnesties
labor market mismatch
welfare state
JEL:F22
J61
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
730412008.pdf315.95 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66875

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.