Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66720
Authors: 
Méndez Naya, José
Year of Publication: 
2007
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 34 [Year:] 2007 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 37-52
Abstract (Translated): 
The aim of this paper is to complement the existing literature on horizontal mergers, by setting a Cournot mixed oligopoly model. Specifically, the merger paradox is qualified by proving that a merger could be profitable for the merging firms even if it does not include most market firms. Furthermore, it is proved that a merger can only be welfare improving if the degree of privatization of the public firm is low enough.
Subjects: 
mixed oligopoly
privatization
mergers .
JEL: 
L00
L13
L33
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
175.56 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.