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dc.contributor.authorBrennan, Geoffreyen
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorKliemt, Hartmuten
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-07-
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-19T15:22:46Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-19T15:22:46Z-
dc.date.issued1997-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064253en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/66255-
dc.description.abstractCan a court system conceivably control opportunistic behavior if judges are selected from the same population as ordinary citizens and thus are no better than the rest of us? This paper provides a new and, as we claim, quite profound rational choice answer to that unsolved riddle. Adopting an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation the complex interactions between moral intrinsic motivation to behave non-opportunistically and extrinsic formal controls of opportunism are analysed. Under the assumption that judges are no better than ordinary citizens it is shown that introducing a court system can nevertheless prevent that the more trustworthy are driven out. It cannot be excluded, though, that courts may themselves crowd out trustworthiness under certain circumstances.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 373 Discussion Paper |x1997,44en
dc.subject.jelA11en
dc.subject.jelA13en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelK00en
dc.subject.jelK12en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTrust relationshipsen
dc.subject.keywordEvolutionary game theoryen
dc.subject.keywordIntrinsic motivationen
dc.subject.keywordCourt systemen
dc.subject.keywordLegal litigationen
dc.subject.keywordHobbesian problem of social orderen
dc.titleTrust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn72936514Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:sfb373:199744en

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