Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/66149 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
Jun-2010
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] The European Journal of Health Economics [ISSN:] 1618-7598 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2010 [Pages:] 331-341
Verlag: 
Zusammenfassung: 
In response to increasing health expenditures and a high number of physician visits, the German government introduced a copayment for ambulatory care in 2004 for individuals with statutory health insurance (SHI). Because persons with private insurance were exempt from the copayments, this health-care reform can be regarded as a natural experiment. We used a difference-in-difference approach to examine whether the new copayment effectively reduced the overall demand for physician visits and to explore whether it acted as a deterrent to vulnerable groups, such as those with low income or chronic conditions. We found that there was no significant reduction in the number of physician visits among SHI members compared to our control group. At the same time, we did not observe a deterrent effect among vulnerable individuals. Thus, the copayment has failed to reduce the demand for physician visits. It is likely that this result is due to the design of the copayment scheme, as the copayment is low and is paid only for the first physician visit per quarter.
Schlagwörter: 
Copayments
Ambulatory care
Difference-in-difference
Count data
Hurdle model
JEL: 
C13
I18
L31
DOI der veröffentlichten Version: 
Sonstige Angaben: 
The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10198-009-0179-9
Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

Datei(en):
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