Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/65786 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2008/27
Verlag: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Zusammenfassung: 
In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an anti-dumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the domestic firm to reduce the degree of competition in the domestic market. The domestic firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the domestic firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the domestic market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports.
Schlagwörter: 
anti-dumping regulations
Bertrand oligopoly
strategic behaviour
JEL: 
F13
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
237.64 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.