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dc.contributor.authorRegner, Tobiasen
dc.contributor.authorRiener, Gerharden
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-10-
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-11T11:27:16Z-
dc.date.available2012-10-11T11:27:16Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-067-3en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64807-
dc.description.abstractWe construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustor has the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisions either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play sequentially, follower trustees who are informed about the leader's choice are significantly more selfish than in the simultaneous move treatment, independent of the leader's choice. Leaders do not behave significantly different than in the baseline treatment. Follower trustees cherry pick the motivation that materially serves them best. When the leader trustee plays selfish, they tend to conform. When the leader makes a pro-social choice, followers seem to perceive the duty as already fulfilled by the leader. While guilt works well as a motivational force in a dyadic situation, it gets alleviated easily when the situation allows a shifting of responsibility.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHeinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) |cDüsseldorfen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDICE Discussion Paper |x68en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelC79en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTeam productionen
dc.subject.keywordTrusten
dc.subject.keywordChoice architectureen
dc.subject.keywordGuilt aversionen
dc.subject.keywordConformityen
dc.subject.keywordFalse consensus effecten
dc.subject.keywordLab experimenten
dc.subject.keywordCherry pickingen
dc.titleMotivational cherry picking-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn727137433en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:68en

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