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dc.contributor.authorDevaro, Jeden
dc.contributor.authorKurtulus, Fidan Anaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-08-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-25T07:19:45Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-25T07:19:45Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64244-
dc.description.abstractWe address four empirical questions in this paper. Is there empirical support for: 1) the risk-incentives tradeoff predicted by agency theory? 2) a positive relationship between authority and incentives? 3) a positive relationship between risk and authority? 4) the main testable implication of Prendergast’s model, namely that the risk coefficient in an incentives regression should become smaller (i.e. less positive or more negative) when delegation of worker authority is incorporated into the riskincentives regression model? Our empirical results support affirmative answers to all four questions, though in some cases the relevant parameters are estimated with low precision. Thus, our analysis contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence clarifying the relationship between risk and incentive pay and how managers optimally bundle incentive pay and the delegation of worker decision rights to cope with risk. In particular, we attempt to reconcile the mixed nature of the empirical literature concerning evidence for a riskincentives tradeoff by empirically addressing Prendergast’s extension of the standard principal-agent model.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Massachusetts, Department of Economics |cAmherst, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2011-13en
dc.subject.jelD21en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.jelD81en
dc.subject.jelM51en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.keywordRisk versus Incentives Tradeoffen
dc.subject.keywordDelegation of Worker Authorityen
dc.subject.keywordPerformance Payen
dc.titleAn empirical analysis of risk, incentives and the delegation of worker authority-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn668009276en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ums:papers:2011-13en

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