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dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kjell Arneen
dc.contributor.authorNyborg, Karineen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:14:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:14:39Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63093-
dc.description.abstractMorally motivated individuals behave more cooperatively than predicted by standard theory. Hence,if a firm can attract workers who are strongly motivated by ethical concerns, moral hazard problems like shirking can be reduced. We show that employers may be able to use the firm’s corporate social responsibility profile as a screening device to attract more productive workers. Both pooling and separating equilibria are possible. Even when a substantial share of the workers have no moral motivation whatsoever, such screening may in fact drive every firm with a low social responsibility profile out of business.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics |cOsloen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum |x2004,25en
dc.subject.jelD21en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.jelD64en
dc.subject.jelJ31en
dc.subject.jelQ50en
dc.subject.jelZ13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSelf-imageen
dc.subject.keywordteamworken
dc.subject.keywordshirkingen
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary abatementen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensethiken
dc.subject.stwCorporate Social Responsibilityen
dc.subject.stwPersonalauswahlen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsethiken
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwVerantwortungen
dc.titleMoral hazard and moral motivation: Corporate social responsibility as labor market screening-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn478454759en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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