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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2004,25
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
Morally motivated individuals behave more cooperatively than predicted by standard theory. Hence,if a firm can attract workers who are strongly motivated by ethical concerns, moral hazard problems like shirking can be reduced. We show that employers may be able to use the firm’s corporate social responsibility profile as a screening device to attract more productive workers. Both pooling and separating equilibria are possible. Even when a substantial share of the workers have no moral motivation whatsoever, such screening may in fact drive every firm with a low social responsibility profile out of business.
Schlagwörter: 
Self-image
teamwork
shirking
voluntary abatement
JEL: 
D21
D62
D64
J31
Q50
Z13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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