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dc.contributor.authorMundaca, B. Gabrielaen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:14:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:14:35Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63090-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes central bank policies on monitoring banks in distress when liquidity provisions are conditional on performance and a bad shock occurs. A sequential game model is used to analyze two policies: one in which the central bank acts with discretion and the second in which the optimal monitoring policy rule is made public. The results show that banks exert less effort and take higher risks with discretionary monitoring policy. With public information about monitoring rules, there is more central bank monitoring and less need to provide emergency financing. Public information about monitoring resolves the multiple equilibria that arise with discretion and a unique equilibrium emerges where the probability of banking crisis is reduced.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics |cOsloen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum |x2007,04en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelG28en
dc.subject.jelG38en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMonitoringen
dc.subject.keywordbailoutsen
dc.subject.keywordbanking crisesen
dc.subject.keywordcommitmentsen
dc.subject.keywordconditionalityen
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken
dc.subject.stwZentralbanken
dc.subject.stwBankenkriseen
dc.subject.stwBankrisikoen
dc.subject.stwBankenaufsichten
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleMonitoring, liquidity provision and financial crisis risk-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn527056308en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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