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dc.contributor.authorBosch-Domènech, Antonien
dc.contributor.authorVriend, Nicolaas J.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T12:59:15Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T12:59:15Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62817-
dc.description.abstractConsidering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players' choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act as an equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closely related small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well as experimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordination devices.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aQueen Mary University of London, Department of Economics |cLondonen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x621en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCoordination gameen
dc.subject.keywordFocal pointen
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordEquilibrium selectionen
dc.subject.keywordCoordination deviceen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwKoordinationen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558918360en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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