Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62787 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 487
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics, London
Zusammenfassung: 
Schelling [1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents' preferences, i.e., no agent preferring the resulting segregation. We examine the robustness of Schelling's model, focusing in particular on its driving force: the individual preferences. We show that even if all individual agents have a strict preference for perfect integration, best-response dynamics will lead to segregation. What is more, we argue that the one-dimensional and two-dimensional versions of Schelling's spatial proximity model are in fact two qualitatively very different models of segregation.
Schlagwörter: 
Neighborhood segregation, Myopic Nash Equilibria, Best-response dynamics, Markov chain, Limit-behavior
JEL: 
C72
C73
D62
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
591.44 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.