Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62671
Authors: 
Kameik, Kenju
Putterman, Louis
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2012-3
Abstract: 
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. In a set of experimental treatments, we find that availability of higher-order punishment increases cooperation and efficiency when subjects have full information on the pattern of punishing, including its past history, and opportunities to punish are unrestricted. Availability of higher-order punishment reduces cooperation and efficiency if it is restricted to counter-punishing alone, if past history is unavailable, and if there is a dedicated counter-punishment stage.
Subjects: 
collective action
social dilemma
voluntary contribution
public goods
punishment
counter-punishment
higher-order punishment
JEL: 
C9
H41
D0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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