Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62644 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2009-1
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we identify a class of non-balanced games which, combined with any other non-balanced game, has an empty core.
Schlagwörter: 
Cooperative Games
Core
Additivity
Issue Linkage
Multi Issue Bargaining
JEL: 
C70
C71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
242.97 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.