Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62633 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2011-3
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal vs. informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest cost. The reason is that informal sanctions achieve more efficient outcomes than theory predicts, especially when the mechanism is chosen by voting.
Schlagwörter: 
sanction
social dilemma
public goods
voluntary contribution mechanism
punishment
experiment
JEL: 
C92
C91
D03
D71
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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