Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62602 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorDe Clippel, Geoffroyen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-17T11:30:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-17T11:30:39Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62602-
dc.description.abstractMost contributions in axiomatic bargaining are phrased in the space of utilities. This comes in sharp contrast with standards in most other branches of economic theory. The present paper shows how Nash's original axiomatic system can be rephrased in a natural class of economic environments with lotteries, and how his uniqueness result can be recovered, provided one completes the system with a property of independence with respect to preferences over unfeasible alternatives. A similar result can be derived for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution if and only if bargaining may involve multiple goods. The paper also introduces a distinction between welfarism and cardinal welfarism, and emphasizes that the Nash solution is ordinally invariant on the class of von Neumann-Morgensterm preferences.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBrown University, Department of Economics |cProvidence, RIen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2009-5en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen
dc.subject.keywordWelfarismen
dc.subject.keywordNashen
dc.subject.keywordKalai-Smorodinskyen
dc.subject.keywordExpected Utilityen
dc.titleAxiomatic bargaining on economic enviornments with lotteries-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn61292064Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
247.61 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.