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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden
dc.contributor.authorEngelmann, Dirken
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Wielanden
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-07T15:39:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-07T15:39:59Z-
dc.date.issued2000-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047125en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62213-
dc.description.abstractIn theory, the incidence of a tax should be independent of which side of the market it is levied on. This principle of liability side equivalence underlies virtually all theories of tax incidence. Policy discussions, however, tend to place great emphasis on the legal division of tax payments. We use computerized experimental posted-offer markets to test liability side equivalence. We find that market outcomes are essentially the same when the tax is levied on sellers as when it is levied on buyers. Prices in both treatments are slightly above the competitive equilibrium. Thus we cannot reject liability side equivalence.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 373 Discussion Paper |x2000,8en
dc.subject.jelH22en
dc.subject.jelC99en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTax Liabilityen
dc.subject.keywordPosted Offer Marketen
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Economicsen
dc.titleTax liability side equivalence in experimental posted-offer markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn722935692en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:sfb373:20008en

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