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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 373 Discussion Paper No. 2000,36
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another variation concerns the information about the multiplier of donations where we compare the benchmark case with a commonly known multiplier to a condition where the multiplier is known for sure only by donators. Questions which we try to answer are: Will indirect reciprocity induce higher or lower donations?, will donators with the high multiplier hide behind the small one?, how do receivers respond to the different situations?
Schlagwörter: 
experiment
reciprocity
Trust
game
JEL: 
C72
C92
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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