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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.contributor.authorGould, Matthewen
dc.contributor.authorRablen, Matthewen
dc.contributor.authorVreeland, James Raymonden
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-07-
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-20T10:37:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-20T10:37:43Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/61040-
dc.description.abstractThe United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks - election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3902en
dc.subject.jelF53en
dc.subject.jelF55en
dc.subject.jelO19en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordUnited Nations Security Councilen
dc.subject.keywordturn-taking normen
dc.subject.keywordelectionsen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Organisationen
dc.subject.stwWahlen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Sicherheiten
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleThe determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn720738806en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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